INTRODUCTION
In the last two decades, the United States has altered its focus in trade policy. This alteration sprang from the United States' attempts to mesh its long-held commitment to multilateralism with regionalism.' During the postWorld War II negotiations for the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 2 the United States championed non-discrimination as the major trading principle and sought to dismantle preferential trading relationships. 3 Even though the GATT, as negotiated, contained an exception to the MostFavored-Nation (MFN) principle to allow Contracting States to form both customs unions and free trade areas, 4 the United States did not take advantage of it until the mid-1980s. The United States entered into two free trade [Vol. 19:3 agreements in that decade. The first, with Israel, 5 was entered into for foreign policy reasons in order to support an ally. The second, with Canada, 6 was a formal recognition of the already closely integrated economies of the two countries. It was the third U.S. free trade agreement, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 7 that marked the shift in U.S. trade policy towards one of multilateralism plus regionalism.
Several factors contributed to this conversion of the United States on the issue of pursuing regionalism as part of its standard trade policy. Almost all of these were related to the U.S. experience with globalization and the multilateral system rather than to any particular belief in the value or efficacy of regionalism. First, during the 1980s, the United States saw the first significant decline in living standards and wages in the post-war period. Perceiving itself as a "diminished giant," 9 the United States came to view the GATT system as one in which it gave much while other countries, such as Japan and the developing countries,'° gave little. Second, the U.S. method of response to the inadequacies of the GATT rules" and its dispute settlement system 2 was to engage in aggressive unilateralism to push its own agenda in the latest round of GATT negotiations, the Uruguay Round. The United States satisfied its goals 
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first term in 2002, he was able to obtain trade negotiating authority. 2 9 This led the Bush Administration to further develop the components of the U.S. system for regionalism begun earlier-Trade and Investment Framework Agreements (TIFAs), 30 Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), 3 1 regional free trade initiatives, and bilateral FTAs. While some of these components for dealing with its goals on trade in terms of goods, services and investment had existed before, 32 they then became part of a process for preparing a region or a country for a closer relationship with the United States. The focus of the system became pursuing trade agreements through regional initiatives and bilateral FTAs. The United States aimed its regional initiatives to cover every major continent or regionAsia, 33 Africa, 34 the Middle East, 35 Latin America 34. The regional initiative here was with the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). These FTA negotiations were launched in 2002, and the goal was to build on the success of the U.S. preference program for Africa, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). USTR, BACKGROUND 
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main competitor in regionalism. The history of the regional initiatives to date has been mixed. Some initiatives, the FTAA and the South African Customs Union Initiative (SACU), have failed or been suspended. 3 7 Other regional initiatives have produced or consolidated FTAs (CAFTA and the Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative (EAI)), while another one provides a framework for a series of bilateral FTAs (Middle East Free Trade Initiative (MEFTAI)).
In addition to introducing these initiatives, the Bush Administration accelerated both the pace of bilateral FTA negotiations and the process for their implementation. Every year from 2003 to 2007, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) completed and Congress approved at least one FTA. 38 All of those agreements, with the exception of CAFTA-DR, have been bilateral agreements. Only one of those bilateral FTAs was formed with a developed country. 39 By the time trade-negotiating authority expired in 2007, the Bush Administration had completed and signed FTAs with three other developing countries -Colombia, Panama, and South Korea -which it promised to pursue before Congress. 4 
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Regional and bilateral FTAs became the "vehicle of choice", 41 for promoting trade liberalization during the Bush Administration. The primary reasons for this refocus on regionalism were two-fold. First, the United States again found that it could not achieve multilateral liberalization that satisfied all of its goals. The Doha Round at the WTO struggled and was eventually suspended over another impasse involving agricultural trade. 42 Additionally, the United States proved unable to gain its preferred result of a comprehensive agreement that went beyond WTO standards with the developing countries in the Western Hemisphere. 43 In response, the United States developed the theory and approach of "competitive liberalization"44-moving forward towards liberalization on the multilateral, regional, and bilateral levels simultaneously. The theory was that regional and bilateral efforts would reenergize and focus WTO negotiations. The approach was to pursue like-minded FTA partners 45 or those countries that satisfied another major U.S. goal in security and/or foreign policy. 46 47 Getting partners to agree to the model FTA was paramount because the model covered all U.S. interests and stood as an illustration of and best hope for pushing U.S. preferences of worldwide trade discipline. What the United States wanted to offer was a true model-an example for imitation or emulation-for the WTO. Should the United States prove unable to move the WTO completely towards its agenda, the FTAs would guarantee achievement on a regional level and, if successful, provide additional credibility for the U.S. positions they embody. 48 The use of a model approach was even extended to how the United States chose its FTA partners. In its recent FTAs-those negotiated after 2002 under the TPA-USTR developed a list of factors for determining which countries should be U.S. FTA partners. The thirteen-factor list of 200249 was reduced in recent years to six. 50 As part of its analysis of the U.S. FTAs, the GAO examined the U.S. strategy for pursuing FTAs and found it had two major elements-using the theory of competitive liberalization and seeking comprehensive or "gold standard" bilateral and regional FTAs. Id. at 17-18. According to the GAO, the recent U.S. FTAs "have a number of absolute requirements, based on the model USTR seeks to use." Id. at 18. In its Trade Policy Review Report to the WTO, the United States also noted that its regional trade agreements could "become models for future multilateral liberalization in new areas such as agriculture, services, investment and environmental and labor standards." US/TPR, supra note 17, at 14. 49. GAO 2004 REPORT, supra note 46, at 7-10. The thirteen factors were: (1) Congressional guidance; (2) business and agricultural interest; (3) special product sensitivities; (4) serious political will of the prospective partner to undertake needed trade reforms; (5) willingness to implement other reforms; (6) commitment to WTO and other trade agreements; (7) contribution to regional integration; (8) support of civil society groups; (9) cooperation in security and foreign policy; (10) need to counter FTAs that place U.S. commercial interests at a disadvantage; (11) need to do FTAs in each of the world's major regions; (12) need to ensure a mix of developed and developing countries; and (13) demand on USTR resources. According to USTR, these factors did not have relative weights. Id. at 7.
USTR,
50. The six factors were: (1) country readiness; (2) economic/commercial benefit; (3) benefits to the broader trade liberalization strategy; (4) compatibility with U.S. interests; (5) Congressional/Private-sector support; and (6) U.S. government resource constraints. Id. at 9-10.
51. Factors 1-3 of the earlier list are on Congressional guidance, business and agricultural
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reform, 52 the cooperation of target countries in security and foreign policy matters, and strategic plans to counter other trading nations. 5 3
II. ELEMENTS OF THE U.S. MODEL FTA
The United States only enters into FTAs and each one must satisfy its model. The FTA is the chosen form of regionalism because it is subject to only limited multilateral discipline-under GATT Article XXIV and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) Article V-and limited WTO oversight. 54 In order to satisfy GATT Article XXIV, the parties to an FTA must agree: (1) to eliminate duties and other restrictive regulations on interest and special product sensitivities. Id. at 7. According to the GAO's interviews with USTR, it consults with Congress before and after FTA partner selection "to ensure support and eventual congressional approval." Id. at 7. Additionally, USTR officials also examine public support, particularly from business and agricultural interests, and assess how the FTA will affect certain sectors that have always been of interest, textiles and sugar. Id.at 7. The Executive Branch rarely moves forward if there is political opposition. See Gantz, supra note 17, at 187 ("Even the most free trade oriented administrations ... are not likely to brave domestic political opposition unless there is enormous pressure from the business community to move forward and some semblance of bipartisan support in Congress."):
52. Factors 4 through 6 of the earlier list-the political will of potential FTA partners to implement trade reform and other reforms-deal with whether the FTA partner is willing to undertake obligations inherent in a U.S.-led FTA. In judging these factors, USTR examines the target country's "trade capabilities" and its "track record in meeting current trade obligations." GAO 2004 REPORT, supra note 46, at 7. Since USTR regards FTAs as a "development tool," it is crucial that the FTA partner be willing to put in place other economic reforms. In choosing an FTA partner, USTR tries to make sure that the country understands "1) how important it is to make this commitment to reform and 2) the extent of the obligations that a comprehensive FTA with the U.S. involves." Id. at 7-8. An example of the type of other reforms undertaken by FTA partners were those taken by Chile to eliminate price controls and privatize state-owned enterprises. Id. at 42. According to USTR, the first factor of the new six factor list, country readiness, involves a "country's political will, trade capabilities, and rule of law systems." Id. at 9. The interagency review done to review FTA partners means that different U.S. agencies examine different issues when evaluating a partner under this factor. USTR examines trade policy issues while the Treasury Department looks at a potential FTA partner's "overall macroeconomic stability and the strength of its financial or banking systems." Id. at 9.
53. Factor 10 of the earlier list-countering FTAs that place the U.S. commercial interests at a disadvantage-deals with one of the realities of the proliferation of regional agreements. Once competing trading nations begin to enter their own FTAs with a potential partner, the United States would be at a disadvantage. This was the primary reason the United States entered into the U.S.-Chile FTA. USTR noted that given Chile's other FTAs (with Canada, Mexico and the EC), Chile had reduced its purchases of U.S. exports by almost one-third. Id. at 8, 42 (noting that the United States lost export market share in Chile due to its other FTAs).
54. GATr, supra note 2, at art. XXIV.; GATS, supra note 16, at art. V. The WTO requires Member States which enter regional trade agreements to notify these to the organization. The Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA) has jurisdiction over these agreements. The WTO agreed in 2006 to establish a review process for these agreements that would include a factual report about the operation of each regional trade agreement. To date, the CRTA has made only limited progress on finalizing its reports. WTO substantially all trade between constituent territories originating in those territories; (2) to not raise duties or other restrictive regulations against nonmembers upon formation of the free trade area; and (3) to achieve these objectives within a reasonable time. 5 There are similar requirements under GATS Article V.
6
As long as the United States and its partners aim for eliminating duties and other restrictions on almost all trade, avoid accompanying this liberalization with a raising of barriers to non-members, and do so within a relatively short 55. GATT, supra note 2, at art. XXIV (5) In evaluating whether the conditions under paragraph I(b) are met, consideration may be given to the relationship of the agreement to a wider process of economic integration or trade liberalization among the countries concerned.
Where developing countries are parties to an agreement of the type referred to in paragraph 1, flexibility shall be provided for regarding the conditions set out in paragraph 1, particularly with reference to subparagraph (b) thereof, in accordance with the level of development of the countries concerned, both overall and in individual sectors and subsectors. Id. at Art. V(l), (2) (footnote omitted). The major elements of GATS art. V are: 1) "substantial sectoral coverage" of the trade services among the parties; 2) that "substantially all discrimination" has to be eliminated either at entry into force or on a "reasonable time-frame"; and 3) that the agreement area not raise the overall level of barriers compared to before the formation of the economic integration area. WORLD TRADE REPORT 2007, supra note 55, at 307.
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time period, they have met the requirements of.GATT Article XXIV. 7 All U.S. FTAs have aimed for eliminating most, if not all, duties and restrictions on all trade (as opposed to "substantially all"). 58 In addition, although U.S. FTAs do result in trade diversion, whereby non-members lose out on market access to FTA parties, 59 the United States has never and would not negotiate any formal restrictions against other trading nations as part of entering into an FTA. With regard to the time it takes to complete the liberalization, U.S. FTAs aim to eliminate most duties and restrictions within ten years of enactment of the agreement. 60 Similarly, once GATS art. V went into effect, all U.S. FTAs were focused on eliminating existing discriminatory measures (and prohibiting new or more discriminatory measures) on trade in services covering almost all service sectors within a similar time frame. Given the GATT/WTO history of not disapproving of regional arrangements, 6 ' it has been easy for the United States to align its regionalism goals with its multilateral obligations.
Other reasons why the FTA has been the favored form are the flexibility it allows and the limited integration it demands. There are no requirements under the GATT/WTO as to either the subject areas or the respective depth of those areas that can be embraced by an FTA. Consequently, the United States has used this freedom to include a significant number of issues-those covering 57. The requirements under GATT Article XXIV and GATS Article V have proven easy to satisfy in part because of the WTO failure to reach consensus on the interpretation of such crucial aspects of the definitions as duties and "other restrictive regulations" and "substantially all trade" in Article XXIV and "substantially all discrimination" in GATS Article V. See WORLD TRADE REPORT 2007, supra note 55, at 308-312 for a discussion of the GATI art. XXIV and GATS art. V elements, which have not been fully defined, and how they might be interpreted.
58 [Vol. 19:3 OF FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS AND MODELS trade in services and trade-linked issues-into its FTAs. Moreover, since the creation of an FTA consists largely of eliminating barriers, rather than crafting common legislation (as required by the customs union, the other form of regionalism under the GATT 62 ), the FTA parties do not have to create a supranational institution to achieve their goals. 63 The limited multilateral discipline and the resulting flexibility combined to allow the United States to develop a model FTA. There is widespread agreement by the U.S. government itself 64 and observers that the United States has been developing a model for FTAs. 65 What it has pursued over the last fifteen years has been FTAs based on two models: the NAFTA model and an adaptation of it, the WTO-plus model. As would be expected, the major aspects of the NAFTA model have remained the same in the later model.
Consequently, this analysis will begin with the common aspects of the models-aspects of the model which have been retained. One obvious feature of the NAFTA model is its design which consists of sixteen subject matter areas, 66 with five other chapters devoted to institutional arrangements and dispute settlements. The treaty text itself, not including the lengthy tariff schedules, is heavily drafted and runs more than three hundred pages. Each chapter is structured the same way-with general definitions appearing at the beginning or end, followed by a section on general obligations and ending with detailed annexes that contain either exceptions and reservations to or special implementation aspects of the general obligations. 67 NAFTA ended up with 62 . Under the terms of GATT art. XXIV, countries forming a customs union must adopt a common external tariff. In effect, this means that the countries must adopt a common trade policy towards non-members. GATT, supra note 2, at art. XXIV(8)(a).
63. A distinction has been suggested for different types of integration efforts. Negative integration by countries involves the removal of discrimination in national economic rules and policies under joint and authoritative surveillance. This would be a free trade area. By contrast, positive integration involves the transfer "of public-market-rule-making and policy making powers from the participating politics to the union level." This would be a customs union. two side agreements (on labor rights and environment cooperation) that were added to the legal obligations of the parties. All of the later FTAs follow the same design, even the same basic ordering of subject matter chapters. 6 Instead of side agreements, however, the later FTAs have side letters that are considered to be part of the text.
69
The major elements of the NAFTA model are its focus on the GATT, its scope and coverage, its limited institutionalism, and its diffuse dispute settlement system. Each of these elements satisfies deeply-held multilateral and domestic trade policy preferences. These can best be illustrated by examining each major element of the NAFTA model.
The NAFTA model embraces the GATT in several ways-through GATT compliance, GATT modeling and GATT adoption. The GATT compliance can be seen in the first Article of the agreement. According to Article 101, NAFTA parties "consistent with Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, hereby establish a free trade area. 7 0 All U.S. FTAs begin the same way. 7 ' The only alteration has been to add compliance with GATS Article V to this commitment. 72 Not only do the Parties announce GATT compliance as the goal under the NAFTA model, but they also commit themselves to respecting their respective rights and obligations under the GATT. 73 This announcement of the FTA's compliance with the GATT and the parties' adherence to the multilateral rules signals the desire of the United States (and its partners) to keep regionalism in its place. 74 An FTA may compromise non-discrimination but only within the parameters established by the multilateral system.
The NAFTA model reinforces this GATT commitment by modeling the language of core obligations regarding trade in goods after GATT provisions. This is done in two ways: either the NAFTA provision adopts the GATT obligation as the standard for the FTA, or it models the language of the substantive area, for example, trade in goods or trade in services, you have to examine the reservations it has taken. The annexes, therefore, are where the deals are struck.
68. Compare the design of the U.S. [Vol. 19:3
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NAFTA rule on the corresponding GATT rule. For example, the core obligation in NAFTA is to apply national treatment to the goods of another party. In Article 301, the provision does not repeat the GATT language on the concept 75 but instead states that the parties "shall accord national treatment to the goods of another Party in accordance with Article III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), including its interpretive notes.
Article 301 concludes by incorporating Article III of GATT, its interpretive notes and any equivalent provision of a successor agreement into NAFTA.
7 7
By contrast, Article 309 on Import and Export Restrictions adopts its general obligations using most of the same language of the corresponding GATT provision in Article XI, 78 and it also incorporates the GATT provision.
75. GATT, supra note 2, art. 111(4) provides:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use. The provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent the application of differential internal transportation charges which are based exclusively on the economic operation of the means of transport and not on the nationality of the product.
Id. at art. II(4).
76. NAFTA, supra note 7, at art. 301(1). 77. Article 301 of NAFTA on National Treatment provides: Each party shall accord national treatment to goods of another Party in accordance with Article III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), including its interpretive notes, and to this end Article III of the GATT and its interpretive notes, or any equivalent provision of a successor agreement to which all Parties are party, are incorporated into and made part of this Agreement. Id. at art. 301. After the completion of the Uruguay Round, which adopted GATT in 1994, the language was changed for all later FTAs. Compare NAFTA, supra note 7, at art. 301, with CAFTA-DR, supra note 36, at art. 3.2: Each party shall accord national treatment to the goods of another Party in accordance with Art. III of the GATT 1994, including its interpretive notes, and to this end Article III of GATT 1994 and its interpretive notes are incorporated into and made part of this Agreement, mutatis mutandis. CAFTA-DR, supra note 36, at art. 3.2.
78. NAFTA Article 309(1) provides: Except as otherwise provided in this Agreement, no Party may adopt or maintain any prohibition or restriction on the importation of any good of another Party or on the exportation or sale for export of any good destined for the territory of another Party, except in accordance with Article XI of the GATT, including its interpretative notes, and to this end Article XI of the GATT and its interpretative notes, and to this end Article XI of the GATT and its interpretative notes, or any equivalent provision of a successor agreement to which all Parties are party, are incorporated into and made a part of this Agreement. Id. at art. 309(1). Compare NAFTA, supra note 7, at art. 309(1), with GATT, supra note 2, at art. XI, which provides:
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export licenses or other measures, shall
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NAFTA displays the same technique of GATT modeling with regard to trade in services. In this instance, however, the language of NAFTA Article 120279 on National Treatment mirrors the language of what became GATS Article I.80 The United States and its partners borrowed the language from the draft of the GATS text that was under consideration during the Uruguay Round negotiations. At the time NAFTA was being completed it was clear that the regional FTA would extend trade discipline to trade in services. By contrast, it was not yet clear that the GATT would complete the Uruguay Round and adopt GATS. Subsequent U.S. FTAs simply follow the NAFTA model on this.
8 '
This same practice is extended even to the General Exceptions allowed under the FTA. Rather than negotiate freely over what should constitute an excuse for violations of core obligations (such as national treatment and the prohibition on quantitative restrictions), NAFTA adopts 82 the limited exceptions allowed be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for the territory of any other contracting party. GATT, supra note 2, at art. XI(1).
79. NAFTA art. 1203 provides that "[e]ach Party shall accord to service providers of another Party treatment no less favorable than it accords, in like circumstances, to service providers of any other Party or of a non-Party." NAFTA, supra note 7, at art. 1203.
80. GATS art. II provides that "[w]ith respect to any measure covered by this Agreement, each Member shall accord immediately and unconditionally to services and service suppliers of any other Member treatment no less favorable than that it accords to like services and service suppliers of any other country." GATS, supra note 16, at art. 11(1). The NAFTA parties also adopted the same language as GATS on National Treatment. Compare NAFTA, supra note 7, at art. 1202, with GATS, supra note 16, at art. XVII(2). The GATS language, in turn, was patterned after the GATT language on MFN and National Treatment.
81. See U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 38, at art. 11.2. The only difference in the language from NAFTA is that it uses the words "service suppliers" instead of "service providers." The provision also has an interpretive note which states that "[t]he Parties understand that 'service suppliers' has the same meaning as 'services and service suppliers' in Article 1: 1 of GATS." Id. at art.11.3 n.3.
82. GATI', supra note 2, at art. XX. Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures: necessary to protect public morals; necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; (c) relating to the importations or exportations of gold or silver; (d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, including those relating to customs enforcement, the enforcement of monopolies operated under paragraph 4 of Article H and Article XVII, the protection of patents, trade marks and copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive practices; relating to the products of prison labour; imposed for the protection of national treasures of artistic, historic or archaeological value; relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption.... Id. at art. XX.
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under Article XX of the GATT. 3 Two consequences flow from this drafting decision. First, the NAFTA conceptions of national treatment and general exceptions will always be informed by the years of experience with the concepts at the multilateral level, including all later interpretations, thus ensuring legal coherence. Second, by adopting the GATT concepts, the drafters could offer the NAFTA parties a choice of forum option for the settlement disputes. With limited exceptions, if a NAFTA party encounters discrimination with regard to trade in goods, it can seek relief not just in the NAFTA dispute settlement system but also in the multilateral system. 84 Article 2005 allows such a choice of forum, subject to limitations, on disputes regarding "any matter" arising under both NAFTA and the GATT, and "any agreement negotiated thereunder, or any successor agreement."
8 5
The NAFTA model established the scope and coverage of all later U.S. FTAs. The subject matter topics go beyond tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade in goods to cover other areas of interest to U.S. firms and traders-trade in services, investment, competition policy and intellectual property rights. The subjects covered in the first part are those related to Trade in Goods 86 --General Obligations, 87 Rules of Origin and special Rules of Origin, 88 Customs 83. NAFTA, supra note 7, at art. 2101(1).
1. For purposes of: Part Two (Trade in Goods), except to the extent that a provision of that Part applies to services or investment, and Part Three (Technical Barriers to Trade), except to the extent that a provision of that Part applies to services, GATT Article XX and its interpretative notes, or any equivalent provision of a successor agreement to which all Parties are party, are incorporated into and made part of this Agreement. The Parties understand that the measures referred to in GATT Article XX(b) include environmental measures necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, and that GATT Article XX(g) applies to measures relating to the conservation of living and non-living exhaustible natural resources. Id. at art. 2101(1).
84. NAFTA does allow the complaining party the choice of forum. However, it gives any third party the right to force a dispute to NAFTA. NAFTA, supra note 7, at art. 2005(2). The NAFTA dispute settlement system is also designated as the forum if the respondent requests such an option in writing, in disputes involving 86. In NAFTA, the part on trade in goods (Part II) always covers both Market Access and National Treatment. This is true for all later U.S. FTAs as well. Included in this part are also special provisions related to sensitive sectors of trade. See NAFTA, supra note 7, at ch. 2. In later agreements, there are often breakouts of some of these provisions for separate chapters. See U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 38, at chs. 2,3.
87. The key general obligations are tariffelimination (art. 302) and national treatment (art. 301). NAFTA, supra note 7, at 301, 302.
88. The Rules of Origin chapters are key to the operation of any FTA. The rules define which goods "originate in" a Party and, therefore, qualify for duty-free treatment. Countries
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Procedures, 89 Agriculture, 9 " Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary Standards and Technical Barriers to Trade 91 and Safeguard rules. 92 The Trade in Goods part of the NAFTA model is built around two main themes-flexibility and accommodation of special interests. That is achieved by several drafting techniques. First, the tariff elimination required to actually open up a market is phased-in for products and can run from the date of enactment to ten years or beyond. 93 This flexibility was built in to allow the FTA partners to negotiate for time-since all openings for sensitive products are back-loaded 9 4 -to adjust for products that will not be competitive when the FTA goes into force. A similar product-based accommodation is provided for by the design of the rules of origin.
The NAFTA rules are widely regarded as generally restrictive (to limit the trade benefits of the agreement to parties) and highly variable across product categories. 95 These features allow the FTA parties to shape specialized rules of origin that will protect certain sectors from competition.
A separate chapter exists to cover obligations by the Parties to liberalize negotiating an FTA are concerned that, without a strict rule of origin, non-member countries will exploit the FTA party with the lowest external tariff as a point of entry into the free area (thereby creating trade deflection) in order to benefit from the duty-free system. 95. This product-specific aspect of the rules of origin is used to shield products and industries. See generally HUFBAUER & SCHOTr, supra note 59, at 474-476 on how the NAFTA rules could be improved to avoid the protectionist aspects. In addition, restrictive and product specific rules are more difficult for traders to apply (and require extensive record-keeping) customs officials to enforce. [
chapter also contains tendering procedures that the parties are to follow in this area. 97 By adding a chapter in this area, the United States was attempting to gain access to a relatively closed-off market for goods and services that was relatively undisciplined at the WTO. 98 There are several chapters covering trade in services--Cross Border Trade in Services 99 and specialized chapters on heavily regulated services, Telecommunications and Financial Services. 1 00 In the chapter on trade in services, the NAFTA model seeks liberalization well beyond that which was ultimately obtained in GATS.'' The technique was to use the negative list approach for negotiating offers in this area. Unless a NAFTA party expressly reserved a services sector from liberalization, it was to be opened to the general obligations on non-discrimination and market access. 1 0 2 The use of the negative list approach has three consequences-it forces greater liberalization, locks in prior liberalization, and guarantees that any new service will be automatically covered by the agreement. 103 The chapter on investment included not only rights for investors but also neutral, binding investor/state arbitration to resolve disputes on these issues. 99. NAFTA, supra note 7, at ch. 12. 100. Id. atchs. 13, 14. 101. GATS used the "positive list" approach to scheduling commitments on trade in services. This means a country must liberalize only in those areas and to the extent specified in the list. With regard to any service sector left off a GATS schedule, a WTO member retains complete control over market access and regulation. 
not only IP rights but also enforcement obligations which must be undertaken by the parties to give them effect. In the NAFTA model, side agreements were added, in response to a new President and Congress, on the impacts of trade in the areas of labor rights and environmental cooperation. 108 The labor and environmental agreements do not create substantive obligations in each area. Instead, in each, the parties are obligated to enforce its labor laws and its laws on environmental protection. 109 The NAFTA model is notable for what it omits from the scope of substantive obligations. Labor mobility is limited solely to temporary entry. There are no rules on the content of the unfair trade statutes (anti-dumping and countervailing duty law). 0 Agriculture, although covered, does not eliminate many of the practices (particularly production subsidies)"' that limit liberalization. None of these issues were considered possible from the U.S. perspective. None of the later U.S. FTAs have altered this assessment.
The final major element of the NAFTA model is its insistence on limited institutionalism and multiple dispute settlement systems. With respect to dispute settlement, the NAFTA model also tried to limit administration. Instead of establishing a central dispute settlement authority, the NAFTA parties created three separate dispute systems. 1 5 These systems handle the major substantive issues covered by the agreement and controversial issues between the parties' 1 6 --Chapter 1 B for Investor/State arbitration, 117 Chapter 19 for bi-national review of Antidumping/Countervailing Duty determinations" 8 and Chapter 20 for resolving claims of violations of the FTA's obligations.' 1 9 The systems differ as to standing, 120 type of legal review' 2 1 and the remedies/relief available. 122 Tailoring each dispute settlement system to these subjects allowed the NAFTA parties to deal with particular problems is done in sub-committees and working groups established for various subject matter area commitments. For an illustration, see CAFTA-DR, supra note 36, at art. 19.1(3) (giving the Free Trade Commission authority to delegate subcommittees and working groups power to modify the tariff phase-out schedule, common guidelines on tariffs and government procurement matters); see also U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 38, at ch. 20.1.
114. Compare NAFTA, supra note 7, at ch. 20, with U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 38, at ch. 21.
115. There are actually four systems for dispute settlement inside the original NAFTA text. The fourth one is a specialized dispute system for disputes in the financial sector. NAFTA, supra note 7, at ch. 19. NAFTA borrowed this idea from the U.S.-Canada FTA. It has not been used by the NAFTA parties. In addition, there are dispute settlement mechanisms attached to both the NAALC and NAAEC. See NAALC, supra note 111, at arts. 27-41; NAAEC, supra note 111, at arts. 22-36.
116. In the U.S.-Canada FTA, Canada pushed for some solution to its belief that the United States was aggressive and unfair in its administration of its anti-dumping and countervailing duty laws. Rather than accept Canada's offer to harmonize legislation, the United States agreed to a bi-national review of final AD and CVD administrative determinations. Canada insisted that the system be carried over into NAFTA. See HUFBAUER 121. In the Chapter II mechanism, an arbitral panel interprets Chapter 11 A obligations based upon a claim of violation. In the Chapter 19 mechanism, an arbitral tribunal reviews the AD/CVD determination for whether it is consistent with the law of the administering country. In Chapter 20, the arbitral tribunal examines claims that there has been a nullification or impairment of benefits expected under NAFTA.
122. The Chapter I 1 mechanism produces a binding arbitral award that can be enforced (for money damages) in court. In the Chapter 19 mechanism, the panel can affirm or reverse and remand the administrative determination. In the case of Chapter 20, the arbitral panel issues a report which can form the basis of a negotiated solution. See NAFTA, supra note 7, at chs. 11, 19,20.
caused by each: in the case of Chapter 11, how to make investment rights credible for investors; for Chapter 19, how to counter the beliefs of Canada and Mexico and bias in the administration of U.S. unfair trade statutes; and for Chapter 20, how to allow for dispute resolution without compelling a solution. 23 The later U.S. FTAs have retained the separate dispute settlement feature with one large exception: no FTA after NAFTA contains the Chapter 19 bi-national review process.
The WTO-plus model retains every major element of the NAFTA model. What has changed is the focus of the model. In all recent FTAs, the United States has tried to expand the gains made in the Uruguay Round and NAFTA in the areas of trade in services, IP rights 124 and government procurement, or to include subjects that have resisted GATT/WTO discipline. 125 These changes were dictated by the desire of the United States to use FTAs as "models for success" for the WTO system.' 26 The theory is that by including them in all regional agreements, the United States will be able to shift WTO Member States towards adopting these issues as a part of its future agenda. At the same time, other subjects have either been expanded or added to the WTO-plus model, notably Transparency/Anti-corruption, 1 27 Electronic Commerce, 128 and 123. Under NAFTA Article 2018, the parties to the dispute actually determine its outcome. Article 2018 provides: "On receipt of the final report of a panel, the disputing Parties shall agree on the resolution of the dispute, which normally shall conform with the determinations and recommendations of the panel, and shall notify their Sections of the Secretariat of any agreed resolution of any dispute." NAFTA, supra note 7, at art. 2018(1).
124. This had led to arguments that the U.S. approach with regard to some subjects, particularly intellectual property, is to seek more than the minimum standards negotiated for under the TRIPs Agreement in FTAs, producing an effect whereby: "[e]ach wave of bilateral free trade agreements contains more extensive intellectual property protections than the TRIPs Agreement... The reasons for the model's evolution and expansion are worth examining. In the case of two areas-investment and intellectual property rights-the model was changed to reflect experiences gained under NAFTA (investment) and to satisfy a powerful domestic interest group (intellectual property). Investment was always a crucial chapter for any U.S. FTA. The goal was two-fold-to encourage intra-regional investment flows by making them more secure, 13 0 and to encourage tariff-jumping investment by nonmember country firms. 13 The United States coordinates trade capacity building assistance through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Trade capacity building was aimed at assisting countries with accession to and implementation of WTO agreements, and to "build the physical, human, and institutional capacity to benefit more broadly from a rules-based trading system." GAO, . Id. at 6-7. The largest proportion projects funded out of TCB were for trade facilitation-which includes, among other things, customs operation and administration and regional trade agreement capacity (defined as "to increase the ability of regional trade agreements and individual countries to facilitate trade and help potential regional trade agreement members.") Id. at 9, Thl. 1. TCB Projects aimed at the Latin American FTA partners of the United States include a project in Central America to improve labor law compliance and a project in El Salvador to help Salvadoran food producers meet SPS standards regarding exports of fruits and vegetables. Id. at 13-14. The USAID approach to regional economic growth in Central America has been done by "taking stocks of each government's capabilities through diagnostic tools." Id. at 22.
130. This motivation was quite strong in the case of NAFTA given Mexico's history of strict regulation of investment and its embrace of the Calvo Doctrine. See generally HUFBAUER & SCHOTr, supra note 59, at 201-02.
131. NAFTA achieves this by granting the Chapter 1IA rights to NAFTA investors/investments which allows non-party state firms to take advantage of them. See NAFTA, supra note 7, at art. 1101(1).
2009] on the U.S. model Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT).'
32 Chapter 1 IA on investment rights covers all of the same rights in the model BIT-national treatment, most-favored-nation treatment, minimum standard of treatment, expropriation and compensation, transfers, performance requirements, and hiring of Senior Management and Board of Directors. Given the experience of the U.S. under the BIT regime, which began in 1980, it was believed that the core obligations and their reach were well understood. NAFTA also borrowed the idea that the rights had to be made effective through neutral investor/state arbitration from the model BIT.
The WTO-plus model version of the investment chapter differs largely in its treatment of two of the core rights-minimum standard of treatment and expropriation/compensation. Aggrieved NAFTA investors have made heavy use of the Chapter 1 B system to challenge government measures in all three NAFTA states. In almost every arbitration, claims were made based on the Minimum Standard of Treatment (Article 1105) and/or Expropriation (Article 1110). Expansive readings of both of these provisions by multiple arbitral tribunals 133 inspired the NAFTA parties to issue interpretations of these provisions and the United States to alter its model BIT and future FTA investment chapters.' 34 With regard to both provisions, the governments were concerned by arbitral interpretations that limited government regulatory power. The revisions to the chapter, therefore, return power to the state and [Vol. 19:3 OF FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS AND MODELS correspondingly limit the types of complaints that can be made under the system.
In the case of IP rights, the WTO-plus model has gone in the opposite direction. In response to a coordinated effort by industry, the United States Trade Representative (USTR), working in conjunction with industry and the IP advisory group for FTAs, has developed a "model FTA intellectual property text," which greatly expands the rights of IP holders 135 beyond those required by the Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (TRIPs) of the WTO and NAFTA. The WTO-plus approach has been to go beyond the TRIPs/NAFTA emphasis on establishing minimum standards to imposing the intellectual property standards of a developed country. 136. The ITAC-15 report on the U.S.-Peru FTA states that "the fact that Peru found it in its own interest to significantly increase its levels of IPR protection beyond that required by TRIPs is testament to the principle that high levels of protection benefits indigenous creators and inventors in the same manner as they do in developed countries." PERU ITAC REPORT, supra note 138, at 5.
137. In recent FTAs, U.S. partners have agreed to patent plants-an area that was left as one a country could consider non-patentable under TRIPs. See TRIPs, supra note 16, at art. 27(3)(b) (for the Trips exclusion) and compare with U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 38, at art. 17.9 (providing for no exclusions). In the most recently adopted U.S. FTA with Peru the language on this issue has shifted again. See U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 38, at art. 16.9 (2)(noting that "Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party from excluding inventions from patentability as set out in Articles 27.2 and 27.3 of the TRIPS Agreement. Notwithstanding the foregoing, a Party that does not provide patent protection for plants by the date of entry into force of this Agreement shall undertake all reasonable efforts to make such patent protection available consistent with paragraph 1.").
138. There has been a push by USTR to negotiate for a provision that would limit an FTA partner's ability to use compulsory licensing. See generally Rajkumar, supra note 127, at 441-43, 474, for what TRIPs allows on the issue in recent FTAs.
139. In recent FTAs, the United States has pushed for the extension of the copyright term closer to the U.S. levels of 'life of the author' plus ninety-five years. It has only achieved that commitment with Oman. In the Peru and Panama agreements, the countries would only agree to what ITAC-15 calls the compromise seventy years. PERU ITAC REPORT, supra note 139, at 12. This goes well beyond the TRIPs minimum standard of fifty years. TRIPs, supra note 16, at art. 12. With regard to patents, the protection offered would be extended if the issuance of the patent was subject to "unreasonable delay." U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 38, at art. 16.9(6)(b). Since developing countries frequently take longer to issue patents than developed countries, this closely these extensions of IP rights come to U.S.-level standards.
140
The WTO-plus IP chapter also emphasizes the importance of the enforcement obligations that FTA partner governments must undertake, 14 ' and it greatly expands all of the types of remedies that must be made available.' 42 The overall effect of these IP additions is to limit the ability of FTA partners to make their own decisions about how to regulate intellectual property. 43 The additions of the chapters on electronic commerce, transparency/anticorruption and trade capacity building have come in response to changes in the nature of trade (electronic commerce) and the shift in FTA partners (transparency/anti-corruption and trade capacity building). The largest proportion of recent FTAs has been entered into with developing countries.'44 In order to aid these Latin American FTA partners, there has been a dedicated attempt to help improve governance and adherence to the rule of law through provision will ensure a patent holder the full enjoyment of the patent term. In the U.S.-Peru FTA, "unreasonable delay" was the later of five years from filing or three years after an examination request. PERU ITAC REPORT, supra note 139, at 15. In earlier FTAs, USTR had negotiated even better terms-the later of four years from filing or two years from examination.
Id.
On patents, the FTAs also prohibit the marketing approval of generic drugs during the term of the drug patent. This provision effectively extends the life of the patent since competing companies must often wait until after the patent has run to produce a competing product. See generally Rajkumar, supra note 127, at 461-468 (discussing this issue in light of the CAFTA-DR FTA provisions).
140. Id. at 5. The industry advisory committee urges USTRto obtain U.S. level standardas was done in several of the MEFTAI bilateral FTAs in future agreements.
141. Id. at 19. The United States wants its FTA partners to accept such standards because despite long term success at obtaining multilateral discipline through rulemaking, the United States still continues "to suffer billions of dollars in losses due to global piracy, counterfeiting and other infringements of rights provided in TRIPs (and in the various FTAs)-primarily due to ineffective enforcement by these trading partners." Id. at 18. It is relatively easy for a developing country to legislate new IP rights protection. It is significantly more difficult to enforce those obligations. The implementation costs are significant and no FTA provides assistance regarding this issue. (2008) (noting that the government limitations on the monopoly given by patents---"how easy or difficult it is to obtain a patent, how long the exclusive fights last, and the extent to which the holder can exclude others from freely using the idea"--are those developing countries use to get access to foreign innovations). It is in exactly these areas that the WTO-plus model IP chapter limits those regulatory powers by developing countries. [Vol. 19:3 OF FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS AND MODELS the expansion of transparency obligations throughout the FTA text and in the adoption of anti-corruption provisions." 45 The addition of trade capacity building to the WTO-plus model was also inspired by realizations that some FTA partners needed basic assistance to benefit from and adjust to the integration of free trade disciplines. 146
III. WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO DEVELOP AND USE A MODEL?
Given the model-driven nature of U.S. regionalism, it is important to analyze the consequences of a model-based system for participating countries. What follows, therefore, is an analysis of the benefits and disadvantages inherent in the use of models. This analysis will begin with the effects of the model on the country producing it-the United States. The benefits to the United States will be examined in order of their importance. The paramount benefit of the use of the model, and one that is enhanced as long as it is used as a baseline and subjected to review and reworking, is that it allows the United States to focus on pushing its agenda on areas of major interest-trade in services, IP rights, investment and government procurement. The United States has succeeded in getting FTAs that cover issues or extend coverage on issues rejected by the multilateral system. Each FTA either covers the areas of greatest comparative advantage (trade in services, creation of intellectual property, and investment capacity), or is built around an attempt to achieve 145. By placing the transparency obligations in a separate chapter, the WTO-plus model attempts to underscore the connection between good governance and strong economics. Anticorruption is now also widely regarded as one of the biggest constraints facing developing countries as they pursue economic growth. The World Bank with its mission of eradicating poverty, for example, has made anti-corruption one of its key priorities-aiming its efforts at World Bank projects. At the same time the topic has attracted a great deal of attention on the issue of the link between corruption and development. between corruption have found corruption has a negative impact on both the rate of investment and GDP growth of countries and that better institutional quality is linked to economic growth).
146. TCB Projects aimed at the Latin American FTA partners of the United States include: a project in Central America to improve labor law compliance and in El Salvador a project to help Salvadoran food producers meet SPS standards with regard to exports of fruits and vegetables. GAO 2005 REPORT, supra note 132, at 13-14. The USAID approach to regional economic growth in Central America has been "taking stocks of each government's capabilities through diagnostic tools." Id. at 22. During negotiations for recent FTAs, particularly those in Central America and the Andean region, there has been a TCB working group led by USTR aimed at helping the countries deal with implementing the FTAs. Id. at 26. USTR suggests trade capacity building initiatives, but actual projects are worked out later. Id. In its most recent self-report to the WTO, the United States described FTAs as capable of contributing to the multilateral system by "introducing innovation and strengthened disciplines" and that TCB is a "critical part of the United States' strategy to help developing countries to implement and take advantage of market-opening and reform-oriented trade agreements." US/TPR, supra note 17, at 14, 22.
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U.S.-level standards (P rights
147 and government procurement procedures), or both. The flexibility of the model also allows the United States to emphasize issues (such as transparency) or add new items (anti-corruption and capacity building) that may help the FTA work more effectively.
Another benefit of the use of the model relates to the efficiency and leverage capacity of negotiations themselves. The negotiations begin with the model being offered as the starting point and, on many issues, the ending point. This allows the negotiations for a complex agreement to be achieved within a few years and at a lower cost in human and financial resources. 148 No major derogation is allowed by any developing country FTA partner. 49 Since the United States does not have to start from scratch each time it negotiates a FTA, politically sensitive issues that have already been dealt with via inclusion in the model in a particular manner' 50 or exclusion' 51 from the model will remain under control. This, in turn, allows the USTR to focus U.S. leverage in negotiations on specific barriers or problems it has with an FTA partner or particular gains it hopes to make. For example, in the case of South Korea, the United States wanted to address long-standing concerns regarding Korean standards that limited U.S. market access. The United States wanted to open up the relatively closed automobile sector in that country. 52 In the case of Panama, the United States was anxious to secure the best possible access to government procurement in order to benefit from the forthcoming major 147. See generally PERU ITAC REPORT, supra note 139, for a discussion of this issue. 148. One of the factors the USTR considers in evaluating FTA partners and its regionalism agenda is the issue of government constraints. GAO 2004 REPORT, supra note 46, at 10. According to the USTR, this issue of U.S. constraints deals primarily with its ability to staff negotiations. Id.
149. In the case of the U.S.-Australia FTA, the United States did agree that the investment chapter did not have to include the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism. Two other FTAs are also without this feature. In the case of the U.S.-Jordan FTA, that agreement was drafted before the model was set. The United States later closed the gap by entering into a BIT with Jordan. In the case of the U.S.-Bahrain FTA, the United States had already entered into a BIT with that country and so had access to invest disputes through that treaty. See U.S. The United States also satisfies foreign policy goals with relatively little cost through the use of the model FTA. With its relatively open markets (in both trade in goods and services as well as government procurement) and its highly developed standards, the United States does not have to devote major resources or efforts to implementing its model FTA. However, the same cannot be said of any of its developing country FTA partners. 1 54 Through the process of negotiating and assisting in implementation of the agreement with its partner, the United States solidifies its access to the existing and future governments of the partner. Even the shallow economic integration with the United States achieved by a free trade agreement makes it difficult, if not impossible, 155 for an FTA partner to withdraw from the agreement. In turn, having common economic goals with the United States makes it harder for an FTA partner to ignore U.S. input or counsel with regard to domestic policymaking and at the multilateral level.1 56 Finally, there is the benefit of increased market access that comes from the use of a model FTA aimed at developing countries. Although an FTA deals with economic integration, the actual U.S. gains here are not significant given overall U.S. market size. The developing country partner, however, inevitably has higher tariffs, tariff-rate quotas and standards barriers that have made market access more difficult. Even if the developing country negotiated well, by protecting sensitive sectors of trade for as long as possible, U.S. market access will improve over the long run. The United States also obtains what USTR describes as a "level playing field" with a developing country FTA partner. Since most of the U.S. FTA partners receive some, and often high levels of, duty free access to the U.S. market, the FTA replaces such preferences with reciprocity. 154. Developing country FTA partners must devote significant resources to not only passing and implementing legislation but also to enforcement, particularly with regard to IP rights.
155. Every U.S. FTA provides the parties with the right to withdraw from the agreement within six months if it provides notice of withdrawal to the other parties. See NAFTA, supra note 7, at art. 2205. However, it would be quite costly for parties to withdraw, and that option has never been seriously considered by any FTA partner.
156. The United States has used the regionalism process to form alliances with developing countries that otherwise might belong to a WTO group adverse to its interests. See GAO 2004 Report, supra note 46, at 10, 52.
157. The Generalized System of Preferences is the largest U.S. preference program-it allows developing countries duty free access to the U.S. market GSP for thousands of products from over 100 designated, beneficiary countries. USTR, A GUIDE TO THE U.S. GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES: GUIDEBOOK 3 (2006), available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_ Development/Preference-Programs/GSP/General-GSP-ProgramInformation/Section-Index. html (select "U.S. Generalized System of Preferences Guidebook"). The current version, which
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There are disadvantages to the United States from the use of the model. These can be categorized as those having primarily domestic consequences and those affecting U.S. multilateral interests. On the domestic side, the use of the model tightly links the U.S trade agenda to the political agenda of the Executive and his party. The power sharing over trade between Congress 'and the Executive has not been well managed since before NAFTA.1 58 There is a split between the parties 159 over the shape and content of FTAs, as evidenced by the close votes on almost every recent FTA and the divide over how and when to extend Trade Promotion Authority (TPA). For example, in 2007, the Bush Administration was forced to accept a Bi-Partisan Trade Deal that required the USTR to alter the model and renegotiate all of the pending FTAs with Panama, Peru and South Korea to reflect demands by the Democrats. 160 At one level, this reworking of the model signifies the reality of power sharing. At another level, it demonstrates that the Executive Branch can push its particular agenda into the model FTA so effectively that it loses touch with Congress.
Another disadvantage of the model with domestic and multilateral ramifications is that the use of a model freezes thinking. The United States has not revisited the basic premises of the NAFTA and the WTO-plus models over the last fifteen years. Is the model-most noted for pushing the U.S. agenda on deep integration issues-a good model? Undoubtedly, the use of the WTOplus model satisfies all U.S commercial goals and builds up some support for its agenda on deep integration issues. However, the focus on "competitive liberalization" has undercut irreplaceable U.S. leadership at the WTO, the better and more just forum for trade liberalization. Even with the efficiency gains achieved through the use of the model, this U.S. brand of "aggressive regionalism" has diverted attention and negotiating resources from multilateral negotiations. Moreover, the insistence on the model has also alienated countries that have resisted the U.S. approach. 158. See generally Taylor, supra note 15, at 15-23, for a discussion of the reasons why it is difficult for Congress and the Executive Branch to share trade policy power.
159. See VAN GRASSTEK, supra note 47, at 7 (noting the difference between the Republicans and Democrats on FTAs and providing a complete breakdown of all trade votes illustrating the differences).
160. USTR, Peru and Panama FTA Changes (May 10, 2007), available at http://www.bilaterals.org/IMG/pdf/05_14 07.pdf. The deal required the changes to the three pending FTAs (Panama, Colombia, South Korea) with regard to labor rights and environmental issues-including placing all disputes on the obligations in those chapters into the regular dispute settlement mechanisms of each FTA-and with regard to IP rights. The IP rights provisions were notable for pulling back from the model IP text on issues related to pharmaceutical patents.
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A final disadvantage to the United States from the use of the model FTA comes from the very thing that makes it successful. The market size and wealth of the United States give it great leverage over its FTA partners. By insisting upon the model FTA, the U.S. approach is, and is seen as, an expression of power. This raises the issue of whether an imposed model of economic growth and development can be a successful "legal transplant." As noted by Alan Watson, legal transplants are a common and fertile source of legal development. 6 1 However, one way to judge a "successful legal transplant" is to assess whether it continues to grow and develop in its new setting. 62 The model FTA offers a "one size fits all" prescription (largely based on developed country standards) for countries at different stages of development and facing different constraints. If the transplanted legal FTA regime fails to assist with economic growth and development, not only will the FTA partner suffer, but the credibility of U.S.-led trade lawmaking will also be undermined.The benefits of the model FTA for developing countries are easier to delineate. The chance to obtain secure access to the large U.S. market and increased foreign direct investment (FDI) motivate developing countries to seek out or accept FTAs with the United States. Entering a reciprocal FTA frees a developing country from having to count on the more limited and uncertain world of preference programs. Moreover, the experience of Mexico under NAFTA suggests that increased market access will occur. intellectual property). 7 6 Scarce resources must be allocated to achieve FTA goals or the developing country will fail to derive the benefits of the agreement and face U.S. displeasure or disputes. Even more importantly, a developing country loses policy space when it accepts a U.S. FTA. 1 77 Some of the possible government interventions that might aid a domestic industry, such as investment restrictions, government procurement set-asides, the limitation of lP rights and subsidizing exports, for example, are foreclosed by the model FTA.' 78 The final disadvantage of the U.S. model is its failure to confront its subjects. The status of the FTA partners as developing countries facing almost every type of resource constraint is largely unacknowledged. Transition periods for phasing in obligations that might assist with adjustment exist only in the trade in goods part of the FTA.1 79 In contrast, the model FTA has strictly limited phase-in for undertaking intellectual property rights obligations. In recent FTAs, these average only two to three years.
180
There has been more of an effort to offer adjustment and implementation assistance through trade capacity building. The WTO-plus model FTA has provisions that establish a Trade Capacity Building (TCB) Committee for each agreement.
1 8 ' There is no textual commitment, however, for financial resources has discovered in dealing with FTA partners that even this first step is difficult. In its report on the U.S.-Panama FTA, the ITAC-15 advisory group noted that at least one FTA partner (Bahrain) had implemented non-compliant legislation and urged USTR to carefully "review all implementing legislation after it has been adopted to ensure that no FTA enters into force until compliance is achieved. 179. These are the tariff elimination phase-in periods and can extend for up to twenty years for sensitive products. However, under NAFTA, the parties frequently met to speed up tariff eliminations.
180. See U.S-Peru FTA, supra note 38, at Annex 16.1; U.S.-Panama FTA, supra note 20, at art 15.3.
181. The U.S. commitment to trade capacity building in the model FTAs is to create a TCB Committee for each agreement. The developing country partners are expected to periodically update and provide the Committee its national TCB strategy. In turn, the Committee will seek to: (1) prioritize projects at a national or regional level, or both; (2) invite donor institutions and other groups to assist in developing and implementing the projects; (3) assist with the implementation of projects; and (4) monitor and assess progress in implementing progress. The TCB Committee is required to meet at least twice a year during the transition period.
[Vol. 19:3 OF FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS AND MODELS to fund actual projects. The U.S. implementing legislation for the FTAs does not contain earmarked funding for TCB projects. Instead, the U.S. approach is to coordinate trade capacity building projects for FTA partners through its overall program. While adjustment projects aimed at major constraints (such as weak or non-existent physical infrastructure) have been funded and are underway, not all developing country FTA partners have yet benefited. 18 2 Moreover, the United States has yet to monitor or assess existing projects for success and effectiveness. 185. Id. at 7,9-11,31-32.
goals at low domestic costs and achieving increased access in FTA partner markets 1 86 -are significant and unlikely to disappear. At the same time it is equally difficult to imagine that the model will remain unchanged. The confluence of three events will alter the use and potentially the content of the FTA model -the worldwide recession, the election of a new President and the shift in the makeup of Congress' 87 and the need for new trade promotion authority for future trade agreements.
Senator Obama campaigned against the approach of earlier administrations to free trade agreements -from NAFTA itselfe 88 to the more recent and pending FTAs.' 89 President Obama must now shape a coherent approach to trade policy, one that will require a rebalancing of multilateralism and regionalism. It seems unlikely that the United States can continue to pursue regionalism as a top priority. In fact, trade policy must now contend for legislative space in a country deeply enmeshed in a financial crisis and a lingering recession. These events require the passage of major domestic legislation aimed at unraveling the financial crisis, stimulating the economy and gaining control over health care and energy policy. 90 Early indications are that trade policy will not be in the forefront of legislative efforts. Nevertheless since most recent economic growth has come from exports, 19 ' the Obama Administration has set out some basic approaches. The top priority will be to focus on multilateralism and the completion of the Doha Round. all aspects of the U.S. policy regarding regionalism will be reconsidered and will move slowly. 1 93 NAFTA will not be reopened 194 but will be expected to cover labor and environmental concerns in the same way as recent FTAs. The pending FTAs with Panama, Colombia and South Korea will be examined for effects on the U.S. and carefully worked through with Congress before any decision to move forward.1 95 Recent meetings with the leaders of these FTA partners have led the Obama Administration to believe that substantive issues of concern on each must be resolved before the FTAs can be sent to Congress for a vote.
1 96 What has yet to be addressed, however, is the approach the administration plans for future trade agreements. This is hardly a surprise since planning for future trade endeavors (whether the completion of the Doha Round or future FTAs) will require the Obama Administration to seek trade promotion authority. 197 As the Executive Branch rethinks regionalism some in Congress are pushing for a complete reworking of how trade policy is formed. This turn of events is also not surprising. Since the creation of the fast track process the President has discovered that seeking trade negotiating authority reopens the debate about the proper balance of power sharing over trade policy.19 8 The first legislation introduced on this topic by the 1 1 1
Ih Congress is the Trade Reform, Accountability, Development and Employment (TRADE) Act of 2009.' 99 The TRADE Act of 2009 would require: 1) the General Accountability Office to conduct a review of existing FTAs based on the current model, 2°° 2) the use of specific FTA provisions in fifteen different subject matter areas, 20 ' and 3) the submission by the President of a plan to renegotiate existing FTAs in accordance with the act's specifications. 20 2 The TRADE Act of 2009 would further shift power towards Congress by having that body set the readiness criteria for FTA partners, mandate the negotiating objectives for agreements, 204 and require its approval of any FTA before it is signed by the President. 20 5 Whether this legislation ever proceeds to a vote, 2 6 its introduction suggests that the Obama Administration must carefully calibrate its approach on trade policy to bring Congress along.
At least two paths appear open to the Obama Administration. First, it can focus on multilateralism and limit attempts at regionalism. This would mean completing the Doha Round and securing passage only of the pending FTAs which have critical Congressional support. It would also mean the indefinite postponement of any future FTAs until there is greater consensus on the proper goals of regionalism. 207 Second, the Obama Administration could work out how to accommodate both a commitment to true multilateralism with regionalism. Such an approach would also require taking a leadership role in the completion of the Doha Round 208 and on most, if not all, of the pending Instead the United States would have to devise a more flexible, less U.S.-dictated model that would allow for FTAs with major developed country trading partners (such as the EC or Japan 2 14 ) or the emerging developing country powers (the BRIC countries 2 15 ) or for completing stalled regional efforts such as the FTAA or initiatives in Asia. 216 Other options for revising the model would be for the U.S. to add other subject matter areas such as infrastructure services, energy and the environment. Proceeding on this path would mean that the United States would eliminate most of the disadvantages of using the current model -the disconnect between the President and Congress over the goals of trade policy, the frozen thinking and the use of FTAs as tools of power. 218 No new model of this type could be achieved without closer cooperation between the Executive Branch and Congress and without educating the public on the gains from such agreements while assisting it with the effects. 219 All of these efforts would See also TPSG Memo, supra note 190, at 7-9 for a discussion of how the TAA program must be altered to offer true access to benefits and play a useful role in a sound U.S. trade policy. It is not enough to assist U.S. workers impacted by trade agreements. The administration is unlikely to develop a successful trade policy without conveying the message that the U.S. stands to gain much from the continued expansion of trade. The Obama Administration is attempting such an effort. See Kirk Speech, supra note 208 (Arab. Kirk noted that one quarter of a million U.S. firms export goods and that almost all of them are small and medium-sized firms "who particularly need our help [Vol. 19:3 OF FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS AND MODELS require a thorough revisiting of U.S. views on the strategic as well as economic goals of trade policy. Crafting a new FTA model with a development focus, however, might achieve both types of goals. 22° When it chooses to negotiate with a developing country partner the U.S. could expand its Trade Capacity Building 221 efforts to ease and assist with the negotiation as well as the implementation burdens imposed by an FTA. Should it take such an approach the United States would address one of the major disadvantages currently faced by its developing country FTA partners. 222 Adapting the FTA model into a development tool would also signal the existence of a true U.S. commitment to the advancement of the interests of developing countries. At the current time it is impossible to measure the value of such a commitment to the world trading system and U.S. credibility. 223 accessing global markets" and that "[e]xporting firms tend to increase employment more rapidly, have higher productivity, and can pay as much as 13 to 18 percent more than the national average.").
220. See TPSG Memo, supra note 190, at 1 ("Trade is so central to most other countries, especially poor countries that depend on it for development, that trade policy is tantamount to foreign policy for many of them.).
221. See id. at 31, 39-40 for a discussion of what the U.S. currently does and fails to do with Trade Capacity Building (TCB).
222. In order to improve how it does TCB, the United States needs to think through what role it wants for the program. A systematic diagnosis of the adjustment issues faced by developing country partners (available from work conducted by the World Bank) would be a starting point. Then, if the goal is to demonstrate how the FTA can complement development, TCB projects would need to be driven by the national development strategy of the developing country partner.
223. Ambassador Kirk expresses it best when he notes that "as the current economic crisis has shown us, in the interconnected global community in which we live-we sail or sink together." Kirk Speech, supra note 208.
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